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Defensive strategies in the quality ladders

Ivan Ledezma1, 2, 3

This paper analyses the potentially defensive behaviour of successful innovators and its effect on aggregate R&D effort. It proposes a quality-ladders model that endogenously determines leader's technology advantages and who innovate (the leader firm or its competitors). Regulation can have either a positive or a negative effect on R&D intensity. It can be negatively associated to aggregate innovative effort in higly deregulated economies. In more regulated ones, where deterring strategies are constrained, it yields incentives to innovate. These predictions are consistent with data on manufacturing industries of 14 OECD countries between 1987-2003.

1 :	CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne
2 :	LEDa - DIAL - Laboratoire d'Economie de Dauphine - Economie de la mondialisation et du développement
3 :	EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics

Mots-Clés : innovative leaders – quality ladders – R&D – regulation – industry-level data

halshs-00586709, version 1

http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00586709

oai:halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr:halshs-00586709

Contributeur : Caroline Bauer <>

Soumis le : Lundi 18 Avril 2011, 11:35:56

Dernière modification le : Mercredi 25 Mai 2011, 12:14:35